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Midwest Video Crop. v. FCC:
The First Amendment Implications
of Cable Television Access
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently
considered the validity of the cable television access rules' promulgated
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1976. In a case
which is currently before the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit held in
Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC' that the rules must be set aside as ex-
ceeding the Commission's jurisdiction.3 The major features of the cable
television access rules provide: That cable systems with 3,500 or more
subscribers designate at least four channels for access use,4 including one
for public access, educational access, local government access, and leased
access;5 that, until demand exists for full time use of all four access chan-
nels, cable operators may combine access programming on one or more
channels;6 that at least one public access channel be supplied free of
charge;7 that operators establish rules providing for access on a first-
come, non-discriminatory basis on both the public access8 and leased ac-
cess9 channels; and that each cable system subject to the rules supply the
equipment and facilities necessary for local production and presentation
of access programs.' 0
Although the court invalidated the Commissions's cable access rules
on jurisdictional grounds, making discussion of the constitutional issues
unnecessary, the Eighth Circuit nevertheless found the first amendment
implications of the rules serious enough to warrant attention. The
jurisdictional issue surrounding the Commission's promulgation of a
wide range of cable television rules is a complicated one which has receiv-
ed much scholarly attention" and is beyond the scope of this note.
'The Federal Communications Commission's cable television access rules appear in
Report and Order, Docket No. 20508, 59 F.C.C. 2d 294, 294-97 (1976).z..
2571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), cert granted, 47 L.W. 3187 (1978).
1Id. at 1029.
'The term "access use" describes the exercise of the right, established under the FCC's
cable rules, to communicate over a cable television channel. Thus, an individual appearing
on the free-of-charge channel or the leased access channel mandated by the rules (see note
5, infra) is exercising his right of access to the cable channel, and the channel may be said
to be set aside for "access use."
'47 C.F.R. §76.254(a) (1977).
'47 C.F.R. §76.254(b) (1977).
747 C.F.R. §76.256(c) (2) (1977). However, live studio programs longer than five minutes
are subject to a reasonable charge for production costs. 47 C.F.R. §76.256(c) (3) (1977).
'47 C.F.R. §76.256(d) (1) (1977).
947 C.F.R. §76.256(d) (3) (1977).
"47 C.F.R. §76.256(a) (1977).
"See, e.g., Barnett, State, Federa and Local Regulation of Cable Television, 47 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 685 (1972); Berman, CATV Leased-Access Channels and the FCC: The Intrac-
table Jurisdiction Question, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 145 (1975); Botein, CATV Regulation:
Jumble of Jurisdictions, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 816 (1970); Hoffer, The Power of the FCC to
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Rather, the focus will be upon the first amendment implications of the
cable access rules.
BACKGROUND
A review of the Supreme Court's approach to the access issue in the
context of other communications media may serve to illuminate some of
the considerations central to the cable access issue.
Broadcast Access
In Red Lion.Broadcasting Co. v. FCC," the Supreme Court upheld the
FCC's personal attack and fairness doctrines. 13 Justice White's opinion
for a unanimous Court placed heavy emphasis on the scarcity of broad-
cast frequencies as a basis for the Commission's regulation.14 The im-
possibility of allowing everyone who so desires to operate television or
radio broadcast stations had necessitated extensive regulation over the
years, and the Court recognized the Commissions' broad authority in this
regard. While the opinion acknowledged that broadcasters possess a first
amendment interest in controlling what they communicate, the Court
concluded that the right of the viewers and listeners is to have access to
"an uninhibited marketplace of ideas,"' 5 and that "it is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."' 6 Thus, in the Court's view, the Commission was justified in
abridging the broadcasters' rights in order to insure the presentation of
diverse ideas over a medium with limited availability to potential
speakers. Moreover, the Court found significant the government's own
role in securing a preferred position for broadcasters through the li-
censing process. This, according to the Court, imposed upon broadcast
licensees a fiduciary-like duty to present views which are representative
of the community.' 7 Guided by these considerations, the justices had lit-
tle trouble upholding the challenged regulations.
Two other aspects of the Court's opinion in Red Lion are worth noting.
A certain deference toward the FCC's view of its own authority is evi-
Regulate Cable Pay-TV: Jurisdictional and Constitutional Limitations, 53 DEN. L.J. 477
(1976); Note, Sports Anti-Siphoning Rules for Pay Cable Television: A Public Right to Free
TV?, 53 IND. L.J. 821 (1978).
12395 U.S. 367 (1969).
3The personal attack rules provide that any station broadcasting a personal attack
must seek out the individual attacked, supply him with a transcript of the broadcast, and
offer him airtime for a reply. 47 C.F.R. §73.123 (1977). The personal attack rules represent
a particular application of the FCC's fairness doctrine, which imposes upon broadcasters
the obligation to cover issues of public importance and to fairly represent different points
of view on those issues. If a paid sponsor for an opposing view is not available, the broad-
caster must provide free time for that purpose. 47 U.S.C. §315(a).
14395 U.S. at 376, 388.
15I1d at 390.
16Id
'Id. at 389. See also id. at 400.
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dent. Referring to the Communications Act of 1934,18 Justice White
declared that, "[tihe construction of a statute by those charged with its
execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that
it is wrong... . ."19 The opinion's approach was also one of caution, as the
Court realized it was dealing with an area in which rapid technological
change is the rule. Thus, the Court preferred to uphold the Commission's
regulations on the basis of the present scarcity of broadcast frequencies
rather than speculate as to their future scarcity or abundance. 20
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee,21 the majority reaffirmed
Red Lion's emphasis on the importance of scarcity in justifying the
regulation of broadcast frequencies. The Court upheld the
Commission's ruling that broadcasters could not be required to accept
paid editorial advertisements. The Court also cited with approval Red
Lion's commitment to the rights of the viewing public, noting that these
rights are served when everything of importance is said.23 When a limited
resource is concerned, the Court continued, it is not essential that
everyone has an opportunity to speak.2 4 As long as the leading view-
points on matters of public concern are represented, the proposed right of
paid editorial access would not appreciably further the viewing public's
interest in being informed. Thus, in balancing the interests of the viewers
against those of the broadcasters, the Court found that while "the in-
terest of the public is our foremost concern, ' 25 that interest simply was
not served by the proposed right of access.
Another reason stated by the Court for its position that a right of paid
editorial access would not benefit the viewer was that the more affluent
would purchase the most editorial time and thus effectively prevent the
presentation of a broader range of ideas.26 Chief Justice Burger'kppinion
for the majority expressed a lack of confidence in the adequacy of the
FCC's fairness doctrine to resolve this problem.
Application of the doctrine, Burger suggested, would only permit the
less affluent to comment on those issues the wealthy have chosen to
raise.27 In Burger's view, the inadequacy of the fairness doctrine meant
that in order to implement the right of access fairly, the Commission
would have to oversee a great deal of broadcaster activity. Determination
of which individuals and viewpoints had received sufficient air time
would be in the Commission's hands, thus risking "an enlargement of
Government control over the content of broadcast discussion of public
"47 U.S.C. §§151 et seq.
"1395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
"fId at 397-99.










As in Red Lion, the Court acknowledged the advisability of according
"great weight to... the experience of the Commission. 2 9 Once again, the
majority sounded a cautious note, praising the virtues of flexiblity in a
fast-changing field.30 Nevertheless, the Court closed its opinion by ob-
serving that in the future, the Commission "may devise some kind of
limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable," citing the
evolving cable television access rules as an example
2 1
Newspaper Access
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,32 the Court held a Florida
statute granting political candidates a right to equal space to reply to
newspaper criticism unconstitutional, as violating the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press. The Court conceded that the
newspaper industry had become a highly monopolized one.33 Entry into
the field, the opinion noted, was almost impossible, and the number of
newspapers in operation had remained quite small. Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court also recognized the public's in-
terest in receiving information from a variety of viewpoints. 3 4 But the
Court found that this interest neither required not justified even this
relatively modest regulation of a limited resource. The best way to serve
that interest, the Court declared, was to pursue Professor Thomas I.
Emerson's suggested use of "[glovernment measures to encourage a
multiplicity of outlets, rather than compelling a few outlets to represent
everybody ... ,,35 The Court emphasized that an enforceable right of ac-
cess, even when limited to political candidates replying to criticism, re-
quires government coercion inimical to the first amendment. 6
The Court was concerned in Miami Herald with the potentially chilling
effect the statute might have upon criticism of political figures.3 7 But
beyond this, the majority declared that the statute imposed a substantial
cost upon newspapers based on their content;38 this cost consisted of not




3 1& at 132.11c_ at 131.
32418 U.S. 241 (1974).
IId at 248-51.
14The opinion finds support for this point in some of the Court's earlier decisions. The
first amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the pub-
lic ..... 418 U.S. 241, 252 (1974), quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945). "[Dlebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 418 U.S.
241, 252 (1974), quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
5418 U.S. 241, 247 (1974), quoting T. EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
671 (1970).





the loss of space the publishers would have used in other ways. It would
be impractical for newspaper publishers to expand their editions in order
to include the replies of political candidates. Thus, publishers would have
to eliminate some of their planned material to accomodate the responses
submitted by candidates. Yet even if there were no additional costs or
loss of space, the Court concluded, the statute still would not pass con-
stitutional muster because of its invasion of editorial judgment, an area
protected by the first amendment.3 9
The State of Mass Media Access
Taken together, these leading decisions suggest that the Supreme
Court has adhered to a scarcity theory as the basis for regulation which
encroaches upon the First Amendment rights of the communications
media. Scarcity due to economic, rather than technological, limitations
has failed to persuade the Court to uphold access regulation.
The Court in Red Lion had no difficulty approving a personal-attack
doctrine applicable to broadcasters who had attained a preferred position
through government licensing, while it unanimously struck down similar
regulations of narrower scope in Miami Herald when directed at unli-
censed newspapers. Thus, the Court has been concerned not only with the
technological scarcity of the communications resource, but with the
presence of a governmental role in determining who may operate through
such a resource.
Red Lion made clear, as Justice Stewart conceded in his CBS concur-
rence,40 that the broadcaster's first amendment rights are not absolute,
but must be balanced carefully against those of the viewing public. While
the Court sustained the position of the newspaper publishers in Miami
Herald, this does not necessarily indicate the majority viewed the
publishers' first amendment interests as superior to those of the readers.
The result probably reflects the majority's belief that the newspaper is
not an appropriate medium for the sort of regulation attempted in that
case, rather than a finding that the publisher's interests are generally
paramount to those of the reader.
Caution and flexibility have guided the Court's approach to the issue of
public access to the mass communications media. A deferential attitude
toward the FCC's judgment has accompanied a wariness toward in-
creasing government involvement in the control of what goes out over
the airwaves or appears in the morning paper. If a cautious approach has
thus far prevented the Court from accepting a mandated right of access
to the media, circumspection has also restrained the Court from ruling
out such a right in the future. As the Eighth Circuit concedes in Midwest
Video Corp. v. FCC, CBS held only that the FCC was not required to force
an access right upon broadcasters. 41 CBS did not hold that the Commis-
39
"d at 258.
40412 U.S. 94, 146 (1973).
41571 F.2d 1025,1049 n.60 (8th Cir. 1978).
19781
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sion was prohibited from doing so. Moreover, the Court concluded its
CBS opinion, as noted above, with a hint that future attempts to
establish a limited right of access might meet with Court approval, and
referred to the cable television access rules as an area of some promise.4 2
Thus, the broadcast regulation cases decided by the Supreme Court have
not foreclosed the possibility of mandated access to mass communica-
tions media.
Previous Cable Television Regulation
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,43 the Court upheld broad
authority on the part of the FCC to regulate the retransmission of distant
broadcast television signals through cable systems." The Court's opinion
concerned itself solely with the issue of the Commission's jurisdiction
over cable television, with no discussion of the first amendment. The ma-
jority concluded that the Commission's regulations served the purpose of
preserving adequate broadcast television service, and were thus within
the FCC's jurisdiction. The Court held that the Commission's authority
was limited to that "reasonably ancillary" to the fulfillment of its broad-
cast television regulatory responsibilities. 4 5
Several years later, in United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,46 the
Court also upheld a Commission rule that "no [cable television] system
having 3,500 or more subscribers shall carry the signal of any television
broadcast station unless the system also operates to a significant extent
as a local outlet by cablecasting and has available facilities for local pro-
duction and presentation of programs."4 7 The Court found this regulation
met Southwestern Cable's requirement of being "reasonably ancillary"
to the Commission's responsibilities for broadcast regulation.48 As in
Southwestern Cable, the determinative issue was that of the FCC's
jurisdiction to promulgate the particular cable television regulations,
with considerable deference once again extended to the Commission's
42412 U.S. 94, 131 (1973).
3392 U.S. 157 (1968).
"The FCC rules (47 C.F.R. §74.1107 et seq. (1972)) at stake in Southwestern Cable in-
volved a number of regulatory powers. The Commission forbade the retransmission by
cable television systems of distant broadcast television signals into the 100 largest televi-
sion markets, unless this service had been offered as of February 15, 1966, or unless the
Commission found that such service was consistent with the public interest. Moreover, the
rules required cable television systems to carry the signals of local broadcast television
stations. Finally, the rules prohibited cable television systems from duplicating local
broadcast television station programming within 15 days before or after local broadcast of
the signal. The Court upheld these rules as within the FCC's broadcast television
regulatory authority, since the rules would enable broadcast television stations to con-
tinue effective service. See note 45 infra.
41392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
6406 U.S. 649 (1972).
"47 C.F.R. §44.1111(a) (1972) (rescinded in 39 Fed.Reg. 43302 (1974)).
4"E.g., 406 U.S. 649, 676 (1972) (concurring opinion).
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own judgment in this regard.49 The Court's opinion raised the first
amendment objective of program diversity only as a possible basis for
jurisdiction, refraining from any discussion of the various first amend-
ment issues involved in the cable television context.
THE CABLE TELEVISION ACCESS RULES
Midwest Video Corp. V. FCC
As noted at the outset, the Eighth Circuit invalidated the
Commission's cable television access rules on jurisdictional grounds.
Nevertheless, the Court refers to its own opinion as the first to raise "the
First Amendment implications of a Commission effort to enforce
unlimited public access requirements." 50 Chief Judge Markey, writing for
the Eighth Circuit, found the first amendment questions raised by the
rules to be of such importance that he took the opportunity to discuss
them by way of dictum, and to declare that had it been necessary, the
Court would have held the rules invalid on constitutional grounds.51
The Court's discussion of the first amendment approves the scarcity
theory followed by the Supreme Court in Red Lion, CBS, and Miami
Herald. The Court cites the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC' for the proposition that the regulatory treatment of cable
television should be substantially the same as that of newspapers, since
the scarcity of each is due to economic, rather than technological, limita-
tions,5" Thus, according to the Eighth Circuit, FCC authority to intrude
upon first amendment rights must be less extensive with regard to cable
systems than it is in the broadcast context. Nevertheless, the Court con-
cedes that the broadcaster's, or cablecaster's, rights are not the only
rights protected by the first amendment. The opinion suggests that if
there were evidence of substantial viewer demand for access programm-
ing, then the Court would necessarily engage in "the most careful evalua-
tion of First Amendment values involved. 5 4 However, according to the
Court, such evidence is lacking, and there is no assurance that if the cable
operators would be compelled to develop additional channel capacity and
allow the public access to their systems, there would be anyone who
would watch such programming. Thus, the Eighth Circuit appears to ac-
cept the preeminence of the viewing public's interest in receiving ideas
and information from diverse points of view. The Court simply finds no
evidence that access programming would serve that interest. Absent
such evidence, the Court's view is that the cablecaster's right to exercise
4 IL
50571 F.2d 1025, 1053 (8th Cir. 1978).
"
tId. at 1056.
52567 F.2d 9 (D.C.Cir. 1977). For an extensive discussion of the jurisdictional and first
amendment issues in Home Box Office, see Note, Sports Anti-Siphoning Rules For Pay
Cable Television: A Public Right to Free TV? 53 IND. L.J. 821 (1978).
53571 F.2d 1025, 1055 (1978), citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,46 (D.C.Cir.
1977).
'571 F.2d 1025,1046 n.54 (8th Cir. 1978).
1978]
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editorial control over its programming ought to remain unimpaired.5 5
The Eighth Circuit distinguishes the cable access rules from the man-
datory program origination rule upheld in Southwestern Cable by noting
that under the latter, editorial discretion as to what original programm-
ing would be cablecast remained in the hands of the cable operator.5 6
Neither Southwestern Cable nor United States v. Midwest Video approv-
ed of cable regulation this extensive, the Court continues, and the
Supreme Court's decisions in those cases should serve avthe boundaries
of permissible regulation. 57 Moreover, the Court points out, the
Southwestern Cable and United States v. Midwest Video opinions did
not address the first amendment values so heavily involved in the cable
access context of the present case.5 8 And even though it concedes that the
Supreme Court's decisions have not precluded the possibility of valid ac-
cess requirements, the Eighth Circuit minimizes the practical importance
of the Supreme Court's favorable reference to the cable access rules at the
close of CBS.5 9 Far more significant, in the Court's view, is the substan-
tive discussion in that case of the probable domination of access time by
the affluent, and the inadequacy of the fairness doctrine to rectify such a
development. It would be impossible to prevent such a result, the Court
fears, without risking an unacceptable level of governmental involve-
ment in the day-to-day programming decisions of the cable operator."
Finally, the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Midwest Video v. FCC is mark-
ed by caution. In the Court's view, the necessity of the cable access rules
is evidenced only by the Commission's speculations concerning the
future. There is, the Court concludes, no showing of a viewer interest
which justifies the Commission's intrusion upon the first amendment
rights of the cable operators. 6'
The Constitutional Considerations
The potential abundance of cable television channels creates the
technology (at least in the foreseeable future) for virtually everyone to
get on the "air" who wants to do so. Thus, it is possible in the cable con-
text to propose a right of access that is perhaps unrealistic in the broad-
cast area. However, as previously discussed, this abundance of channels
also removes the basis on which the Supreme Court has most often
justified regulation of the communications media: the scarcity of the
regulated resource.62 Yet, as the D.C. Circuit conceded even while in-
validating the cable regulations involved in Home Box Office, "The
55Id. at 1053-54.
16Id. at 1055.
"Id. at 1038 n.29.
"Id. at 1055.
"See note 31 supra.
60571 F.2d 1025,1054 (8th Cir. 1978).
"Id. at 1059-63.
1"See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting




absence in cable television of the physical restraints of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum does not ... automatically lead to the conclusion
that no regulation of cable television is valid. 63 Clearly, this position has
the support .of the Supreme Court, as the Court has upheld the cable
regulations challenged in Southwestern Cable and United States v.
Midwest Video. Moreover, the absence of scarcity relates primarily to the
complex jurisdictional question, which is not under examination here. If
the Commission's jurisdiction to issue its cable access rules may be
assumed, as we have done here, in order to reach the first amendment
question, then the relevance of the lack of scarcity lies mainly in the
absence of the viewer's interest in preventing airwave chaos which would
make viewing impossible.6 4 Also, as noted above, the abundance of cable
channels negates the argument that a right of access is impossible due to
technological limitations. Thus, we may reach the more critical question
of whether an access right would serve the interests of the viewing
public. Rather than preclude access regulations, at least as far as con-
stitutional grounds are concerned, the abundance of cable channels
merely complicates further the process of balancing the rights of com-
munications media operators and viewers.
The abundance of cable channels may also permit the avoidance of
some of the undesirable aspects of the FCC's fairness doctrine.6 5 The doc-
trine may have functioned well in the broadcast situation, where channels
are limited and mandated access would necessarily consume a substan-
tial portion of a broadcaster's air time. However, as we have seen, these
considerations are not present in the cable context, where an operator can
have so many channels at his disposal66 that the setting aside of as many
as four is at least arguably reasonable. Thus, cable channel abundance
suggests it may be unnecessary to depend upon a cable operator's deter-
mination, under the fairness doctrine, of what issues are deserving of
"air" time, which viewpoints will be represented, and what spokesmen
will appear.
63567 F.2d 9.46 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
6 Broadcast television stations must all use a scarce resource: the airwaves. Only a
limited number of stations may broadcast their signals without interfering with each
other. If there were no regulatory limitations imposed, the result might be that no one
could communicate over the airwaves. This state of affairs has served as the ba';is for the
FCC's regulation of television and radio. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, at 376, 388 (1969). Cable television systems, however, do not use the airwaves, and
thus are not constricted by the scarcity of that resource.
65See note 13 supra for description of the fairness doctrine.66The Eighth Circuit notes in Midwest Video Crop. v. FCC that present technology
enables a cable system to carry as many as 80 channels, and that future replacement of
cable by the laser-ray may allow an unlimited number of channels. 571 F.2d 1025, 1030n.6
(8th Cir. 1978). See Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 419, 424 (1972);
Note, Cablecasting: A Myth or Reality - Authority of the Federal Communications Com-
mission to Regulate Local Program Origination on Cable Television - An Evaluation of the
Commission's Cablecasting Rules After United States v. Midwest Video Corporation, 26
RUTGERS L. REv. 804, 804-05 (1973).
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A final comment on the relevance of the apparently unlimited capacity
of cable television is suggested by Justice Stewart's remark in his CBS
concurrence. It is the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, Stewart declared,
that necessitates regulation in order to insure diverse programming6 7
The implication is that if there is no scarcity of the communicative
resource, then diversity will develop naturally and regulation for that
purpose is unnecessary. However, as shall be discussed further below, it
is not at all certain that such diversity will develop under the business
practices of cable operators in the absence of an enforceable right of ac-
cess.
In assessing the acceptability of the cable access rules in relation to the
first amendment, it may be helpful to consider the relative public or
private character of the cable television "forum." Clearly, the cable
system situation is distinct from that present in the traditional public
forum cases.6 8 In the latter, the Supreme Court balanced the first amend-
ment rights of the listener against the private property rights of property
owners. In the cable situation, however, the Court must balance the
listener's right against the first amendment right of the cable operator to
exercise editorial discretion and control. The balance is one of first
amendment interests; thus, the listener's right, while foremost, faces a
stiffer challenge than it did from the owners of private property in the
public forum cases.6 9
But is cable television somehow more "private" than broadcast televi-
67412 U.S. 94, 135 (1973).
6 The public forum cases consist of a line of Supreme Court decisions determining when
private property is so "public" in nature that citizens who have entered the property have
an interest in speech protected by the first amendment. The line begins with Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, distributed religious literature
on the streets of a town privately owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Marsh was
arrested and convicted under Alabama's criminal trespass statute. The Supreme Court
overturned the conviction as violative of the first amendment. The property on which
Marsh was passing out literature was privately owned, but had all the characteristics of a
town. The Court stressed that citizens, including citizens of a company town, need to be in-
formed. Twenty years later, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), the Court considered a state court injunction banning the
peaceful picketing of a store in a privately owned shopping center. Finding the shopping
center to be the equivalent of the Marsh company town's business district, the Court held
the injunction to be inconsistent with the first amendment. However, soon after Logan
Valley, the Court came out differently in another shopping center case. In Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), the Court upheld a state injunction banning anti-war
leafleteers from passing out handbills at a privately owned shopping center. The Court
reached this result in spite of the fact that the Lloyd shopping center was larger than that
involved in Logan Valley, included a wider range of stores and services, and was con-
siderably intermingled with public streets. The Court minimized the "business district"
language of Logan Valley, and limited Marsh to its unique fact setting, that of the com-
pany town. The shopping center, in the view of the Court, was essentially private in
character, the public being invited only for designated purposes. Those purposes did not
include communication concerning issues and events unrelated to the center.
69The Court's opinion in Marsh stated that "[wihen we balance the Constitutional rights
of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as
we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position."
326 U.S. at 509. Thus, the first amendment interest of the listener was weighed more
[Vol. 54:109
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sion? Cable systems serve a fairly small percentage of the population.7 0 A
substantial subscription charge is required,7 1 - resulting in reduced
availability to the general public. However, cable television is
theoretically as available to anyone as broadcast television, it is a forum
clearly dedicated to the purpose of communication, 72 and its subscribers
can reasonably be expected to increase in number as the cost of subscrip-
tion declines.
Nevertheless, there remain two factors which might persuade the
Court that cable television is in some sense too "private" for the imposi-
tion of access requirements. Cable systems, unlike broadcast television
stations, do not use the airwaves, which constitute a public resource.
Moreover, cable operators, unlike broadcasters, have not achieved a
preferential position as a result of governmental involvement.
Whether cable systems are ultimately characterized as public or
private in nature, the constitutional validity of the cable access rules will
still depend primarily on a finding that they serve the first amendment
interests of the viewing public and that these interests outweigh those of
the cable operators. The Court has consistently followed this balancing
approach.73 Clearly, the access rules impinge upon the cable operators'
exercise of editorial discretion. Moreover, they impose a potentially
substantial economic cost on the cable operators by requiring all cable
systems with 3,500 or more subscribers to carry at least twenty
channels,7 4 four of which must be designated for access use .7 However,
the FCC has attempted to reduce this burden. The 1976 revision of the
earlier rules extends, for most systems, the deadline for compliance with
the twenty channel requirement until June 21, 1986.76 Moreover, the
rules provide that until demand exists for full time use of the four access
channels, access programming may be combined on just one or more
heavily than the rights of the private property owner. However, the viewer enjoys no such
advantage in the cable television context, where his interests are balanced against other
first amendment interest, i.e., those of the cable operator.70As of 1975, 15.3% of American households with television sets subscribed tc cable
television. This percentage, however, represented 10.8 million households. Robinson, In-
troduction and General Background in DEREGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION 6 (P. Mac-
Avoy ed. 1977), quoting National Cable Television Association release, November 12,
1975.
7
1A typical installation fee ranges from $10 to $15, while monthly subscription rates
average between $6 and $10. Id.
"One of the tests employed by the Court in the public forum cases, note 68 supra, was
whether the property on which the would-be speakers attempted to exercise their first
amendment rights had a general purpose and use "consonant" with such an exercise. E.g.,
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, at 319-20. The
Court found this to be so in the company town case (Marsh) and in one of the supermarket
cases (Logan Valley). Clearly, the purpose of cable television systems is communication,
and thus such systems are, at least in this respect, "public" forums which may be required
to accomodate the first amendment rights of others.
73E.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
"47 C.F.R. §76.252(a) (1976).
1-47 C.F.R. §76.254(a) (1976).
7647 C.F.R. §76.252(b) (1976).
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channels." Furthermore, while a system must provide at least one full ac-
cess channel, any system which.had insufficient activated channel capaci-
ty on June 21, 1976 need only provide portions of those channels current-
ly available for access use.7 8 Thus, the economic cost imposed on cable
operators may be less serious than the Eighth Circuit supposed. This
conclusion is further supported by evidence that future expansion of
cable facilities not designed to carry more channels may be very expen-
sive and time-consuming.79 Thus, the rules encourage the operators of
large cable systems to construct expandible systems, which may save
them future expense.
Therefore, in balancing the cable operator's rights against those of the
viewer,80 it appears that while there is a substantial impingement on the
former's editorial discretion, the economic burden imposed may not be so
great. In any event, the Supreme Court, since Red Lion, has consistently
adhered to the notion that the viewer's right is paramount 8' and must
prevail in the balancing of first amendment interests. Indeed, as the
Eighth Circuit concedes in Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, "[i]f, in broad-
casting where viewing is free, 'the interest of the viewer is paramount,'
[citations omitted] it would appear more so in cable systems, where
subscribers must pay. '82
The key to the fate of the FCC's cable access rules may thus lie in the
Supreme Court's finding as to whether they do, in fact, serve the viewer's
interest. As a practical matter, the rules may fail to acieve the goal of
diverse programming."3 The rules' requirements may prove so burden-
some that they would inhibit the anticipated expansion of cable televi-
sion. There may be insufficient funds for cable access programming,"'
free production being provided only for the first five minutes.85 In either
event the rules would fail to promote the viewer's interest in "the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
7'47 C.F.R. §76.254(b) (1976).
7847 C.F.R. §76.254(c) (1976).
'"Most cable systems begin with 12 channels. These channels use the low and high por-
tions of the MHz spectrum. Additional channel capacity requires use of the middle portion,
and would necessitate the reconstruction of a system originally designed to carry only 12
channels. See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1030n.6 (8th Cir. 1978).
"It should be noted that, to date, the Supreme Court has been unimpressed with
arguments for a right of access which stress the first amendement rights of the would-be
speaker. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973). Obviously,
should the speaker's interests find a place in future balancing by the Court, they would add
weight to the side of a right of access to cable television.
8
'See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
82571 F.2d 1025, 1046 (8th Cir. 1978).
83A good brief discussion of the first amendment goal of diversity appears in Note, Anti-
Siphoning Rules for Pay Cable Television: A Public Right to Free TV?, 53 IND. L.J. 821
(1978).
8
'See Note, supra note 66, at 828, 831.




Beyond this, there is the critical question of whether there will be any
viewers: will anyone watch access programming? If a subscriber has paid
a substantial price in order to see the year's best motion picture, or most
X-rated picture, how often will he tune in the access channel to hear his
mailman's views on municipal finance or school desegregation? One sug-
gested means of insuring an audience is to require cable operators to pro-
mote access by seeking out potential users and by advertising access pro-
grams to subscribers . 7 However, this would increase substantially the
economic burden on the cable operators without assuring the existence of
an audience whose first amendment interests are supposed to be at stake.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit's insistence on a showing that access program-
ming will receive an audience appears well taken.8
Even if there is an audience, it is necessary to question whether the
rules will in fact tend to promote diverse programming. The Court must
findwhether allowing any member of the public access to a cable channel
will result in a broader range of information and ideas, or merely provide
additional outlets for self-promotion and show business. Although
Justice Brennan has made clear his belief that, at least in the broadcast
context, public access would indeed promote desirable diversity, 9 it is
uncertain whether a majority of the Court would find this to be true in
the cable television context.
The Supreme Court has expressed a concern, shared by the Eighth Cir-
cuit, that the implementation of any right of access would risk the
dangers of increasing governmental control of the communications
media. 0 One possible trouble area is the battle that may develop among
potential users for the best time slots on the access channels.91 Some
determination will be necessary as to who can use the channels at what
times. These decisions might be left entirely in the hands of the cable
operators themselves. However, leaving this much control to the cable
operators might hinder the achievement of diverse programming. The
"Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). In order for the FCC's cable
access rules to further the communication of information and ideas from a variety of view-
points, the rules must not inhibit the growth of cable television systems. If the rules im-
pose too many costs on cable operators, the industry may not prove profitable enough to
expand so as to reach a large percentage of the population. In this event, the rules would
prove counterproductive, by limiting the number of cable systems which could com-
municate diverse viewpoints to their subscribers. Similarly, the rules may not significantly
advance the goal of diverse programming if many potential users of the free access channel
are deterred by the production costs imposed on programming exceeding five minutes.
Thus, it is possible that the rules may not serve the viewer's interest in diverse
programming due to these practical economic factors.
"'See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1046 n.53 (8th Cir. 1978), citing Brief
of Intervenors, National Black Media Coalition at 46.
8571 F.2d at 1059-63.
"CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 184 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
9See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); Midwest Video Corp. v.
FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1054 (8th Cir. 1978).
9"See Botein, supra note 66, at 444; Note, supra note 83, at 832.
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argument is that since cable operators will still be running other channels
on a commercial basis, it will be in their interest to draw the largest possi-
ble audience for those channels.9 2 Thus, while required to designate public
access channels available at no charge or reduced lease rates, operators
may discourage their subscribers from watching those channels by
scheduling the least attractive access programming during prime-time
hours. Under these circumstances, the Commission might well find it
necessary to regulate the assignment of access time slots, both to pro-
mote diverse programming and to fulfill its duty under the access rules to
provide for first-come, non-discriminatory access. In this event, the
danger of a level of governmental intrusion inimical to the first amend-
ment would be substantial.9 3 The assignment of access time slots would
involve the Commission in the day-to-day operations and editorial deci-
sions which should, if possible, remain with the cable operators.
Yet, it may be that governmental involvement in the cable situation
would only be equivalent to or even less than that existent in the broad-
cast area. Under the fairness doctrine, the Commission must review
broadcast programming content to satisfy itself that "worthwhile"
issues are covered and "representative" viewpoints receive exposure.
The Commission must, if petitioned, determine what editorials broad-
casters must accept, and what replies they must broadcast. These deter-
minations would seem unnecessary in an access setting,95 and whether
'9See Botein, supra note 66, at 423; Note, supra note 83, at 832-33.
93This is evidenced by the sort of procedure proposed in Botein, supra note 66, at 444-48,
which requires the Commission to become far too extensively involved in what are essen-
tially matters of editorial discretion.
9'Further potential for increased governmental intervention in the operation of cable
systems lies in the possibility of Commission regulation of rates charged for the leased ac-
cess channel or or for the production costs of programming on the free access channel
which exceeds five minutes and is thus subject to charg. See Note, supra note 83, at
829-30.
Another question raised by the problem of governmental involvement is whether the
provisions for leased access (47 C.F.R. §76.256(d)(3)) and free access (47 C.F.R.
§76.256(c)(2)) might fare differently under constitutional analysis. Free access, of course,
circumvents the concern of the CBS majority, that the viewpoints of the affluent would
predominate under the right of paid editorial access examined in that case (412 U.S. 94,
123). The leased access provision, on the other hand, comes squarely within the ambit of
the Court's concern. Yet, application of the fairness doctrine to the leased access channel
might counter this objection by insuring that all viewpoints, not just those of the wealthy,
are expressed. The CBS majority argued that the fairness doctrine only permits the poor
to respond to the issues that the affluent have chosen to raise, and that application of the
doctrine to editorial advertising, at least, might create more problems than it would solve.
412 U.S. at 123. The Court may have overstated its position, however, as it failed to
acknowledge the doctrine's requirement that issues of public interest generally receive
coverage. Thus, the choice of issues would not remain wholly in the hands of the affluent
who purchase editorial time. The fairness doctrine may or may not have a useful role to
play in the cable access area. But it is by no means clear that we ought to abandon its use,
and its continued application would place the Commission's leased access requirement on
the same constitutional footing as its free access provision, each requiring some degree of
governmental involvement in programming decisions.
5However, it is uncertain what role the fairness doctrine might continue to play where
public access to cable television is concerned. See, e.g., Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571
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the extent of government control would be greater under an access right
than it already is under the fairness doctrine remains an open question.
Finally, in this attempt to assess the probable fate of the cable access
rules, it is worth noting that these regulations are the FCC's own crea-
tion. As we have seen, the Supreme Court has in the past adopted a
deferential posture toward the Commission's judgment.9 6 Here, the Com-
mission has departed from its traditional position in the broadcast area
by endorsing a relatively substanfial right of access to cable television.9 7
The Court may respond by departing from past practice and brushing the
cable access rules aside. However, if previous deference to the Commis-
sion has been sincere, and that posture is maintained in this situation,
then the Court may take the Commission's position into account in
resolving an otherwise equal balance of considerations.
CONCLUSION
The FCC's cable television access rules, invalidated by the Eighth Cir-
cuit on jurisdictional grounds in Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, will soon
be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The purpose of this note has been to
examine the first amendment considerations which ought to guide the
Court, should the Court reach the constitutional issue.
It has been argued here that many of the considerations that the Court
has found persuasive in reviewing the access regulation of other com-
munications media support the validity of the cable access rules. On the
other hand, cable television is, in some ways, a more private forum than
broadcast television; also, there is an absence of resource scarcity, which
the Court has required previously in upholding FCC regulations. Yet, the
potential abundance of cable television channels has implications which
cut both ways, and the cable rules clearly have not been precluded by
Court decisions in the broadcast area. Deference to the FCC's judgment
lends strength to the access proponents' case, as does the fact that the
economic burden imposed by access requirements may be less for cable
operators than for broadcasters or newspaper publishers.
Nevertheless, the most important question for the Court is whether the
rules ultimately serve the interest of the cable television viewer in
receiving information and ideas from a variety of viewpoints. It is the
viewer's interest which the Court has found must prevail in the balancing
F.2d 1025, 1054-55 (8th Cir. 1978). The FCC regulations currently apply the fairness doc-
trine to cable systems which cablecast original programming. 47 C.F.R. §76.209(a). While
application of the doctrine would seem inappropriate in the context of public access pro-
gramming, the courts have yet to resolve the question.
6See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973); Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
"That is to say, the current cable television access rules are considerably broader in con-
cept and impact than the very limited individual right of access established by the per-
sonal attack doctrine upheld in Red Lion, supra note 96.
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of first amendment rights, and the cable viewer's interest is particularly
deserving of precedence, as he directly supports the cable system
through his subscription. Thus, the Court will have to determine whether
the rules will in fact promote program diversity and whether there will be
an audience for access programming to benefit from such diversity.
The Court indicated in CBS that some sort of limited access right
might meet with its approval in the future. But whether that approval
will come in Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC remains to be seen. The Court
has approached the access question cautiously in the broadcast context,
and presumably will do so with regard to cable television as well. In this
connection, it is of significance that should the Court find the rules do
serve the viewer's interest, it would be unnecessary to go so far as to
weigh the speaker's rights or recognize a right to effective free speech in
order to uphold the rules as consistent with the first amendment.
Yet, it may be that the Commission's approach is not cautious enough.
Mandated public access to certain cable channels is an encroachment,
however modest, upon the cable operator's first amendment right to exer-
cise editorial discretion. The Court has upheld such intrusions with great
reluctance, and only in order to protect the viewer's first amendment in-
terest in exposure to a variety of viewpoints. Moreover, it may prove
easier to implement a right of access in the future than to rescind it once
it has proved unnecessary or undesirable. Thus, it seems advisable to
withhold constitutional sanction of the cable access rules until such time
as a convincing showing is made of their necessity and effectiveness. The
Commission has, of course, provided for minimal compliance until there
is sufficient viewer demand to justify four full access channels. Their im-
pact thus modified, the rules may prove modest enough to win Court ap-
proval, perhaps on some sort of trial basis. But the minimal compliance
provision only serves to reduce the burden imposed on cable operators,
whereas the threshold question, when dealing with first amendment
rights, must be whether any burden at all is justified. The right of access
to cable television adopted by the FCC appears to meet many of the first
amendment requirements which a right of access to broadcast facilities
might not. Nevertheless, judicious flexibility in an area of fundamental
rights and rapid technological change suggests that a constitutional
sanction of the cable access rules depends upon a showing that the rules
will in fact serve the cable television viewer's interests, that potentially
less drastic means such as the fairness doctrine are inadequate to serve
those interests, and that a level of governmental involvement inimical to
the first amendment would not necessarily result.
JOHN K. SILK
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